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SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

LOREN CRAIG SIMS,
Defendant-Appell,ant.

12966

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was a criminal action brought by the State
of Utah against defendant-appellant, Loren Craig Sims,
charging him with the crime of rape in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, section 76-53-15.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 28th
day of October, 1971, the jury found the defendant-appellant guilty of rape. On December 3, 1971, defendantappellant was sentenced to be confined in the Utah State
Prison for an indeterminate term.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming the
verdict and judgment rendered by the jury at the trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the facts as set forth in
appellant's brief, with the following additions and corrections.
1. There is a question with regard to the time sequence of events after the defendant and Miss Link came
down Mill Creek Canyon. Miss Link testified that after
coming down Millcreek Canyon, she and the appellant
arrived at Lew Arnold's house at 11: 30 p.m. or 12:00 a.m.
(T. 96) and stayed there about an hour. They then left
the Arnold house and arrived at Miss Link's boyfriend's
house at 1: 00 a.m. (T. 97). Her boyfriend was not home
and Miss Link requested that Sims take her home. Sims
requested that they go by his shop because he feared that
it might have been burglarized. They arrived at Sims'
shop at 1:30 a.m. (T. 99). They didn't go to any other
residences between the time they left her boyfriend's
house and they arrived at Sims' shop (T. 132, 133). The
jury verdict would indicate their acceptance of the above
rather than defendant's statement.

2. When they arrived at the shop, no light<; were
on (T. 99). Sims unlocked the door and asked Miss Link
to come inside with him because he was afraid (T. 100).
Sims told Miss Link to go in front of him (T. 101). She
started walking in front of Sims and was hit on the head

several times and fell to the floor unconscious. She heard
nothing before she was hit (T. 101, 103). When she came
to, she was aware that her pants were down and that two
buttons were tom off of them (T. 104). She also testified that she wasn't in the same location in the shop as
when she had collapsed (T. 104).
3. Vlhen she came to, Sims told her that burglars
had hit her. She responded that she thought Sims had
struck her (T. 104).
4. Sims made contradictory statements to the court
and to police officers with regard to the above mentioned
incident.
(a) Harold Lee Robinson, who, at the time the
alleged rape took place, was a police officer for the Salt
Lake City Police Department, testified that Sims told
him that when he and Miss Link arrived at his shop, the
third time, the lights were on and the padlock on the
door was open, but the hasp was closed. Robinson further testified that Sims told him (Robinson) that he
(Sims) went into the shop, turned off the lights, locked
the door and returned to the car. Robinson testified that
Sims told him he felt impressed to return to the shop
and that Miss Link accompanied him, because she was
scared and didn't want to stay in the car (T. 26-287) .
(b) Richard A. Johnson, a police officer for Salt
Lake City, testified that Sims told him that when he and
Miss Link arrived at his shop, the lights were on and the
door was open. Johnson testified that Sims told him he
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turned off the lights and was going to lock the door when
Miss Link came up beside him. Sims then told Officer
Johnson he decided to go into the shop, whereupon he
was hit and shoved down without losing consciousness.
He told Officer Johnson that he immediately got up,
helped Miss Link in to the car and took her to the hospital (T. 260).
(c) Lee Price, a Salt Lake City police officer, testi·
fied that Sims told him that on the third visit to his shop,
as he arrived, he noticed that the door was open and the
lights were on. Sims then said that he went inside,
checked around, turned off the lights, locked the door
and left. Price testified that Sims stated he then went
back to the car, decided something was wrong, and returned to the shop with Miss Link where, upon unlock·
ing the door, he was struck. Sims himself testified, with
regard to these events, that he drove to the shop and the
lights were out and the door was ajar. Miss Link got
out of the car with him. The hasp was not shut, and he
didn't see the lock (T. 101) .
(d) In another instance, Sims denied that any
statement was made to him about a sexual attack on
Miss Link until some time after December 5, 1973. Lee
Price testified, however, that he told Sims on December
5 1973 that Miss Link had said she had been raped (T.
'
'
266). Harold Lee Robinson testified that he heard Lee
Price tell Sims that Miss Link claimed she'd been rapP<l
(T. 291).

(5)

Miss Link testified that when she awoke in
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Sims shop, she believed Sims had struck her. She also
believed that she had been raped (T. 219).
Dr. Victor Stevenson testified that he examined Miss Link at approximately 9: 00 a.m. on December 5, 1970, and found mobile sperm in her vagina; that,
in his medical opinion was deposited there within the
last 12 hours (T. 164).
(6)

(7) It was established that Sims came by to pick
Miss Link up at 9: 00 p.m. (T. 86) on December 4, He
was with her until he took her to the hospital in the early
morning hours of December 5. Dr. Stevenson made his
examination of Miss Link at approximately 9: 00 a.m. on
December 5, 1970.

Miss Link testified that she was never married
to Craig Sims and didn't give Sims permission to have
sexual intercourse with her (T. 502).
(8)

Robert Allen Yockey testified that on or about
September 15 or 16, 1971 (T. 174), Sims, in a conversation with him on the third floor of the Salt Lake County
Jail, told him (Yockey) that he (Sims) had taken a girl
to his shop, knocked her unconscious, and raped her (T.
105 or 178).
(9)

(10) Gary Phelps was called to rebut Mr. Yockey's
testimony. He (Gary Phelps) testified that he had overheard a conversation between Sims and Mr. Yockey, in
which Sims said that he had been jumped in his shop.
Mr. Phelps testified that this conversation took place
betv..een September 21, 1971, and October 1, 191, nearly
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a week after Mr. Yockey's private conversation with Sims
on the 15th or 16th of September.
( 11) Keith Stauffer testified that he interview~
Sims on December 7, 1970, in his office at the Metropoli.
tan Hall of Justice (T. 271). At the time of the in~r
view, Sims was not a suspect (T. 272) in the presen1
rape case. During the course of the interview, Stauffer
advised Sims of his "Miranda rights" (T. 665) because
his account of the events of December 4 and 5, 1970, wai
different from that told by Miss Link (T. 278).
(12) Evidence of injury to Miss Link's breast was
introduced (T. 111).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
STATE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL MADE
OUT THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE AND WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE
JURY TO RENDER A FINDING OF
GUILTY.
The crime of rape is defined in Section 76-53-15,
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as "[A]n act of sexual in·
tercourse accomplished with a female, not the wife of
the perpetrator, under any of the following circum·
stances:"
( 1) When the female is under the age of
thirteen years.

..
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(2) Where she is incapable, through lrmacy or any other unsormdness of mind, whether
temporary or pennanent, of giving legal consent.
(3) Where she resists, but her resistance
is overcome by force or vioknce.
(4) Where she is prevented from resisting
by threat.s of immediate and great bodily harm,
accompanied by apparent power of execution,
or by any intoxicating, narcotic or anaesthetic
substance administered by or with the privity of
the accused.
( 5) When she is at the time unconscious
of the nature of the act, and this is known to the
accused.
(6) Where she submits under the belief
that the person committing the act is her husband, and this belief is induced by any artifice,
pretense or concealment practiced by the accused with intent to induce such belief. (Emphasis added)

The evidence presented by the state showed that the
defendant Sims violated Section 76-53-15, U. C. A. The
evidence presented showed that on the morning of December 5, 1970, Sims (1) requested the prosecutrix to
precede him into his shop; (2) then struck her over the
head, rendering her unconscious; (3) and while the proseuctrix was in this unconscious state, the defendant Sims
engaged in sexual intercourse with her against her will.
The actions of the ddendant clearly fall within the
proscribed activities set forth in Section 76-53-15, U. C. A.
(1953), defining the act of rape.
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Specifically, Miss Link at no time cosented to engage in the act of intercourse with defendant. In ordei
to overcome her will not to have intercourse with him
defendant Sims struck her over the head, rendering he;
unconscious; and thus overcoming her will not to have
intercourse with him. This action falls within the prohibitions of Subsection 3 of Section 76-53-15, U. C. A
(1953).
In addition, at the time intercourse occurred, the
prosecutrix was unaware of its occurrence. Sims' aci,
that of knowingly engaging in intercourse with the prosecutrix while she was unconscious of the nature of the act,
falls within the proscribed activitiey set forth in Subsec·
tion 5 of Section 76-53-15, U. C. A. (1953). There was
ample evidence before the jury to prove the elements
of the crime of rape.
Utah courts deem the uncorroborated testimony of
the prosecutrix sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict (See
State v. Rees, 43 Utah 447, 135 P. 270 (1913); State v.
Boyes, 47 Utah 474, 155 P. 335 (1916); State v. Miles,
122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211 (1952); State v. Hodges, 14
Utah 2d 197, 381 P. 2d 81 (1963)). It goes without say·
ing that such uncorroborated testimony is sufficient to
make out the elements of the crime.
The prosecutrix testified that upon regaining con·
sciousness, after being struck in Sims' shop, she found
her pants down and two buttons were off of them. She
then testified that she believed Sims had both struck
her and raped her (T. 104).

..
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Although sufficient alone to sustain a conviction, the
prosecutrix's testimony was corroborated by the following: (1) she was treated for massive head injuries at
the L. D. S. Hospital on the morning of December 5,
1970; (2) a picture of the prosecutrix's injured breast
was introduced into evidence (T. 111) - she previously
testified that prior to her date with Sims, her breast had
not been injured (T. 104) - (3) Dr. Victor Stevenson
testified that he performed a pelvic exam of Pauline Link
at 9: 00 a.m. on December 5, 1970. During the course of
this exam, he found mobile sperm in the prosecutrix's
vagirni. He further testified that in hi<; best medical
judgment, this spermatazoa had been deposited by means
of intercourse within the previous 12 hours (T. 163-164).
The prosecutrix had previously testified that she had not
engaged in sexual intercourse for the previous five or six
days (T. 485). This excluded the possibility that the
spermatazoa was deposited in the prosecutrix by means
of intercourse with someone other than Sims. The prosecutri.x also testified that she was not married to the defendant and that she had never consented to have intercourse with him. The state's evidence clearly made out
the crime of rape as set forth in Section 76-53-15, U. C. A.
(1953).

Appellant would have this court believe that the
evidence presented by the state was also insufficient to
sustain a verdict of guilty. In State v. Laub, 102 Utah
402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942), this court articulated the rule
tn be followed when questions of the sufficiency of the
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evidence are raised. Justice Wolfe, m speaking for a
unanimous court, said:

Whik the State's evidence is circumstantial, such evidence may lie just as conclusive or
even more so than direct evidence, but the prosecution still has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Or
stated another way, the prosecution must "not
only show by a preponderance of evidence that
an offense was committed, and that the alleged
facts and circumstances are true, but they must
also be such facts and circumstances as are incompatible, upon any reasonable hypothesis,
with the innocence of the accused, and incapable
of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis
other than the defendant's guilt." People v.
Scott, 10 Utah 217, 37 P. 335 ... As pointed out
in Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Fourth Edition, page 21, "All the circumstances as proved
must be consistent with each other, and they
are to be taken together as proved. Being consistent with each other and taken together, they
must point surely and unerringly in the direction of guilt. * * *" 131 P. 2d at 807. (Emphasis added.)
The evidence presented by the state was incompatible
with any other finding than that Sims: (1) took the
prosecutrix to his shop; (2) requested that she precede
him into the shop; (3) struck her over the head; (4)
raped her and ( 5) made up a story of robbery t.o cover
the crime.
The following evidence supports this hypothesis:
( 1) Miss Link testified that Sims unlocked the door or
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the shop and requested that she precede him inside (T.
101); (2) she testified she was struck on the head from
behind (the location of the defendant) and fell unconscious to the floor (T. 101); (3) when she gained consciousness she testified that her pants were down below
her knees and some of the buttons had been tom off
(T. lQc!); (4) she testified that at that time she believed
she had been struc~~ on the head and raped by Sims (T.
104); (5) the finding of spermatazoa by Dr. Stevenson
during a pelvic exam of Miss Link (T. 163); (6) the inconsistent and conflicting statements made by Sims 1;o
police officers with regard 1;o the alleged burglary of his
shop. From this evidence, a jury could and did find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant raped the
prosecutrix (see Statement of Facts) .
It is unlikely (if not improbable) that Sims and

Miss Link were struck over the head by burglars at Sims'
shop, as appellant maintains. There was no evidence of
a forced entry, i.e., no damage to the locks, doors or windows of the shop; no reported loss of property nor signs
of a struggle or fight.
It is just as illogical to believe that Miss Link would
fabricate a rape story in order to explain away evidence
of sexual intercourse with her boyfriend when the pelvic
exam which showed that intercourse had taken place was
only performed after allegations of rape were made by
Miss Link. Had Miss Link not claimed rape during the
examination of her head wounds, the pelvic exam would
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not have been conducted; and the fact that intercourse
had taken place would not have been established.
The possibility of any other reasonable hypothesil
being foreclosed, the jury was justified in concluding, as
they did, that Miss Link had been raped by the defen.
dant Sims.
Even if more than one reasonable inference coula
be drawn from the evidence, this court, in State v. That·
clwr, 108 Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258 (1945), stated that
"where different reasonable inferences can be drawn
from the evidence, the question is one exclusively within
the providence of the jury" - Id. at 68. The evidence
being more than adequate to sustain the finding of fact
arrived at by the jury, this court should be very reluctant to overturn that jury verdict.
This point was again articulated by this court m
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P. 2d 246 (1970).
The court wrote:
"[W]here a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence should be looked
upon with caution, and that it must exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of
defendant. This is entirely logical, because if
the jury believes that there is a reasonable hypothesis in the evidence consistent with the defendant's innocence, tlwre would rwturally be
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Nevertheless,
that proposition does not apply to each circum·
stance separately, but is a matter within the
prerogative of the jury to determine fro~ all of
the facts and circumstances shown; and if there-

13
from they are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded the evidence as excluding every other reasonable hypothesis. Unless
upon our review of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences fairly to be deduced therefrom,
it appears that there is no reasonable basis therein for such a conclusion we should not overturn
the verdict. 470 P. 2d at 247. (Emphasis added.)
See also State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P. 2d
183 (1960).

The jmy had sufficient basis from the evidence presented at trial to find the defendant guilty of the crime
of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. This court should,
therefore, refrain from overturning the findings of the
jury and should sustain the verdict and judgment of the
trial court.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE.
It is a well settled proposition in Utah case law that
a change of venue is within the trial court's judicial discretion and subjected to review only for abuse of such
discretion. In appellate review of the exercise of this
discretion, the appellant must satisfy the Supreme Court
that the trial court exercised its discretion clearly against
reason and evidence, State v. Smith, 11 Utah 2d 'lB7, 358
P. 2d 342 (1961) ; State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P.

2d 478 (1948); State v. Carrow, 64 Utah 87, 228 P. 563
(1924); State v. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40 P. 2d 961 (1935).
Respondent submits that appellant has failed to show
that the trial court exercised such abuse.
It is recognized that there was publicity commensur.
ate with the magnitude of the crime. This cannot, and
should not be eliminated. A mere showing of publicity
on its own, however, is not sufficient grounds for granting
a change of venue. The likelihood of prejudice must be
shown to be so persuasive that it would influence the
jury and prevent a fair trial.

The case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 86
S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966), cited as support for
appellant's position involved prejudicial news coverage
carried to the extreme.
Much of the material printed or broadcast
during the trial was never heard from the witness stand, such as the charges that Sheppard
had purposely impeded the murder investigation
and must be guilty since he had hired a prominent criminal lawyer; that Sheppard was a perjurer; that he had sexual relations with numerous women; that his slain wife had characterized
him as a "Jekyll-Hyde"; that he was a "barefaced liar" because of his testimony as to a
police treatment; and, finally, that a woman con·
vict claimed Sheppard to be the father of her
illegitimate child. Id. at 356-7.
Such glaring prejudice is found nowhere is the neWs
coverage of the Craig Sims trial.

111e court in Estes v. United States, 335 F. 2d 609
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 379 U. S. 964, 13 L. Ed. 2d
1)59, 8[) S. Ct. 656, rehearing den., 380 U. S. 926, 13 L. Ed.
2d 814, 85 S. Ct. 884, took some reasoning from the Supreme Court decision in Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S.
541, 82 S. Ct. 955, 8 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1962), when they said:
There was no specific showing of bias and
prejudice by appellant resulting from the widespread publicity, and the fact alone of such publicity did not in itself constitute a sufficient
showing of bias and prejudice.
Appellant cites Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 81 S. Ct.
1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961), to support his contention.
A close reading of that case will show that the appellant
there had become a notorious celebrity in a relatively
small county - not like appellant in our case. In building up to their decision in the case the court discussed
their feelings regarding normal publicity for a criminal
prosecution. In 366 U. S. at pages 722 and 723 they said:

It is not required, however, that the jurors
be t.otally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and
diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest
of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of
those best qualified to serve as jurors will not
have formed some impression or opinion as to
the merits of the case. This is particularly true
in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as t,o the guilt
or innocence of an accused, without more, is
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sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to estab.
lish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if
the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Spies v. Illirwis, 123 U. S. 131,
41 L. Ed. 80, 8 S. Ct. 21, 22; Holt v. United
States, 218 U. S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 2,
20 Ann. Cas. 1138; Reynolds v. United States,
98 U. S. 145, 155, 25 L. Ed. 244, 246.
The court is clear in stating that if a juror is aware
of the facts and even has an opinion regarding them, so
long as he can lay aside that opinion and render a vet·
diet on the facts, there has been no reversible error committed. In Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P. 2d
305 (1967), affirmed, 447 F. 2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. den., 391 U. S. 924 (1968), this court held that the
fact that jurors may have become aware of purported
facts of a case through publicity does not disqualify them
if they can swear to impartiality. See also Sinclair v.
Turner, 447 F. 2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 391
U.S. 924, 88 S. Ct. 1822, 20 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1968).
An examination of the trial record shows that the
judge specifically questioned the potential jurors as to
whether or not " [t] hey had seen the defendant's name
in print" (T. 58) or if they had seen or heard a news report concerning the defendant Sims on the radio or tele·
vision (T. 58). Finally, the judge asked whether any of
the jurors had "[a]ny knowledge whatsoever about Mr.
Sims other than the fact that he is now charged with an
offense which is to be tried by this court" (T. 58). Those
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juror.'-' who an::;wered affirmatively to any of the above
questions were dismissed. As can be readily seen, the
jury, as finally impaneled, consisted of individuals who
had not remembered hearing, reading or seeing anything
with reference to Mr. Sims in the news media. This
clearly shows a lack of prejudice on the part of the jury.
To insure as much as possible that once impaneled the
jury would not be prejudiced, the court further instructed
the jury, during the course of the trial, to remain aloof
from all outside influences of publicity (T. 141, 288).
More specifically, at the request of defense counsel, the
court reminded and admonished the jury to avoid newspapers and television in order to avoid obtaining any
factual information outside of the courtroom (T. 385).
Respondent submits that in view of the care with
which the jury was selected and the manner in which the
trial was conducted, appellant's contention that reversible error was committed by the trial court in denying
his motion for a change of venue is without merit and
should be dismissed accordingly.

POINT III.
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW HAS DENIED HIM
WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE REFUSED TO
GRANT HIS MOTION TO DEPOSE THE
PROSECUTING WITNESS IS A MISSTATEMENT OF THE FACTS, SINCE SAID MOTION WAS NEVER RULED ON BY THE
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TRIAL COURT DUE TO DEFENSE COUNS E L ' S F A I LURE TO NOTICE IT FOR
HEARING.
Appellant erroneously contends that his right ro due
process of law was denied him when the trial court faileiJ
to grant his motion to depose the prosecuting witnes&
Nowhere in the trial record is there evidence that the
motion was ever heard by Judge Hall. It goes without
saying that if never heard by the judge, the motion could
not be denied.
The motion in question may be f.ound in the trial
record at page 7. It was admittedly filed on May 18,
1971, in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office but was
never docketed or noticed for hearing in the trial courl
The burden of docketing and noticing obviously falls on
the party desiring the motion to be heard - namely,
James N. Barber.
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's
contention in this regard is totally without merit and
should therefore be ignored. Even if the motion had
been heard and denied, no error would have been com·
mitted. The general rule followed by the state courts ol
Utah is that prior to trial, dfense counsel does not have
a right to preview the state's evidence. This position
was articulated by Justice Callister in State v. Faux,~
Utah 2d 350, 345 P. 2d 186 (1959). While dissenting on
another point, he said:
(A] person charged with a crime by infor-
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mation (rather than by indictment) is not
afforded the opportunity to preview the prosecution's evidence. Id. at 365.
In the case at bar, the deposing of the prosecutrix certainly falls within the preview prohibition referred to by
Justice Callister. This same view has been expressed on
numerous other occasions. See United States v. Garrison,
291 F. 646 (1923); Meyers v. State, Tex. Crim. App., 491
S. W. 2d 412 (1972) ; Reynolds v. State, Ct. of App. Ind.,
292 N. E. 2d 290 (1973). The appellant cites a number
of cases for the proposition that reversible error is committed when the prosecution knowingly and purposely
withhold5 and/ or hides exculpatory evidence or allows
false evidence to go uncorrected. Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. (1959); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791
(1934); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); State v. Thompson, 396 S. W.
2d 697 (Missouri, 1965). Respondent asserts that these
cases are inapplicable to the case at bar, since no exculpatory evidence was withheld by the prosecution.
Appellant would have this court believe that if he
had been able to discover the identity of Miss Link's
boyfriend, he would have been able to impeach her testimony that she had not engaged in sexual intercourse
for five to six days prior to her date with Sims. Respondent respectfully submits that appellant is merely attempting to create issues for appeal. No evidence has been
brought forward showing that Cory Jensen, Miss Link's
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boyfriend, actually did engage in intercourse with tht
prosecutrix sooner than five days before her date with
Sims. In addition, defense counsel had ample opportun.
ity to discover the name and whereabouts of Cory Jensen
during the preliminary hearing. If the importance of Cory
.Jensen's testimony was discovered after the preliminary
hearing, the defendant Sims could have told Mr. Barber
where Cory lived, since Sims and Miss Link had been a!
Jensen's residence on December 5, 1970 (T. 97). It would
have then been a simple task to go to Cory's residenet
and obtain the supposed "exculpatory evidence."
The other cases cited by appellant are of little worth,
since they deal with criminal actions in federal courts.
Such actions are governed by federal rules of criminal
procedure, which rules were clearly inapplicable in thi~
Utah State Court proceeding.

POINT IV.
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COM·
MITTED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN AL·
LOWING THE PROSECUTION TO INTRO·
DUCE INTO EVIDENCE THE CLOTHING
WORN BY THE PROSECUTRIX AT THE
TIME SHE WAS RAPED.
The trial court at its discretion allows evidence con·
nected with the commission of a crime to be introducea
if the court is satisfied that the evidence is in substan·
tially the same condition as at the time the crime wa;
20
committed (Sta.te v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.
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670 ( Hl72) ) . In deciding whether or not to allow evidence to be introduced, the court considers the circumstances su1rnunding the preservation and custody of the
evidence. If, after considering these factors the trial
comt determines that the items in question are in substantially the same condition, they may be admitted. In
the case at bar, the trial court heard testimony from
which it would and did conclude that the clothing of
prosecutrix, introduced at trial, was in substantially the
same condition as it was at the time it was removed from
her in the L. D. S. Hospital on December 5, 1970. The
prosecutrix testified that at the time the clothing was
removed, it was soiled. Specifically, she testified that the
panties were soiled and dirty when they were taken off
at the hospital. She then testified that they were in substantially the same condition - that is, soiled and dirty
- when they were introduced into evidence in the trial
court. The trial court was, therefore, satisfied that the
clothing was in substantially the same condition and,
therefore, admissible. Any prejudice which may be done
to defendant's case by the introduction of questionable
evidence is eliminated, because the jury may disregard
the evidence if there is doubt as to whether or not the
article in question is "substantially the same" or if cor-

rect custody procedures were followed. Thus, there exists a double safeguard assuring that the defendant remains free from any ill effect which may result from the
introduction of erroneous evidence.
It appears that, as a consequence of these two safe-
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guards - namely, the trial judge and the jury _ thi,
court has declined to overturn the ruling of the trial court
in these matters unless there is a showing of actual abuSt
of discretion on the part of the trial judge (State v. Mad
sen, supra, at 111).
If error was committed, and respondent main.
tains there was none, such error was so minimal lli
to fall with the harmless error category. The state';
case, even without the admission of the clothing worn
by the prosecutrix, was strong enough to sustain a verdict
of guilty. (Review of the sufficiency of the state's e~·
dence will not be undertaken here in order to conserve
this court's valuable time. Instead, the court will be r~
spectfully referred to the arguments presented in Point
I of Respondent's Brief.)

POINT V.
REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS NOT COMMITTED, NOR WAS APPELLANT DENIED
DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE INTRO·
DUCTION OF THE TESTIMONY OF ROB·
ERT YOCKEY.
Appellant asserts that reversible error was coounitted
by the state in introducing the testimony of Robe~
Yockey during the trial proceedings. It appears that
appellant would have this court assume the responsibil
ity of the jury and rule on the credibility of a witnes>
Such a position is clearly contrary to the position taken
by this honorable court. In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah Ji
110, 307 P. 2d 212 (1957) at 114, this court said:
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The very essence of a trial by jury is that
the jury are the exclusive judges of the weight
of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses
and the facts to be found therefrom.
Clearly, it is the prerogative of the jury to determine
fact from fiction, truth from falsehood. To usurp this
jury function would undermine the very foundation of
criminal justice.
If Mr. Robert Yockey's testimony was as "[o]bviously fabricated" (Appellant's Brief - P. 81) as appellant maintains, defense counsel should have had no trouble discrediting such testimony under cross examination
or introducing rebutting testimony. Such is the purpose
of the adversary system of the law. Any attack on the
quality of testimony should be made in the trial before
the trier of fact to insure the proper functioning of that
system.

Appellant points out inconsistency in Mr. Yockey's
testimony in order to discredit him or show that his testimony is tainted. Respondent asserts that very few
inconsistencies exist and those that do exist can be easily
explained. Contrary to what appellant would have this
court believe, Mr. Yockey did not say that Sims had
sprained his ankle. Rather, Yockey indicated that Sims
may have said his ankle was hurting (T. 183). Further,
appellant asserts that Yockey testified Miss Link had
a broken leg as a result of the rape (Appellant's Brief P. 28). The trial transcript does not contain such testimony. To the contrary, Yockey admitted that he was
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not sure and couldn't remember if Sims had even rela~a
such a fact (T. 1813) .
Although Yockey did testify that Sims told him he
called the police from his shop, this inconsistency, when
reviewed in the context of the entire testimony, does no!
viewed in the context of the entire testimony, does not
prevaricator or liar, as appellant maintains. If mere in·
consistencies render testimony inadmissible, and the in.
clusion of such testimony, reversible error, the testimony
of Mark Richmond should be excluded also. Rather, in·
consistencies go to the credibility of the witness. In State
v. Jarett, 112 Utah 335, 178 P. 2d 547 (1947), at 340, thil
court said:
However these uncertainties and inconsistent statements go only to the credibility of the
witnesses, and to the weight to be given to their
testimony. These are properly matters for the
jury's determination and we assume were considered by the jury during its deliberation.
Appellant further cites numerous cases for the proposition that the knowing use of perjured testimony is
reversible error. Respondent submits that not only has
appellant failed to show that the S'tate knowingly used
perjured testimony but has failed to show that perjure.1
testimony was used. Respondent therefore respectfully
submits that no reversible error was committed in intro·
ducing the testimony of Robert Yockey.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
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REFUSING TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY
OF JACK BRADY CONCERNING THE
PROSECUTRIX'S RE PUT AT I 0 N FOR
CHASTITY, SINCE SUCH TESTIMONY
WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES OF
FACT OR LAW BEFORE THE COURT AND
JURY.
The general rule regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning the prosecutrix's reputation for chastity in rape proceedings, is that such evidence is admissible if consent is raised as a defense.
This view was expressed by this court in State v.
Scott, 55 Utah 553, 118 P. 860 (1920) at 563:

In view that the defendant denied that he
was with the prosecutrix on the night in question, and denied that he had had sexual intercourse with her then or at any time, we cannot conceive how such evidence had any relevancy in this case, except perhaps to affect the
credibility of the prosecutrix.
A similar view has been adopted in other jurisdictions. In Peopl,e v. Gabler, 111 Ill. App. 2d 121, 249 N. E.
2d 340 (1969), the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the
trial court's refusal to admit testimony of the prosecuting
witness's reputation for chastity, saying:

The reputation for chastity in a rape case
is only material where the defense is cnosent.
Id. at 343.
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A similar view was expressed in Peop/,e v. Cox, 383 Ill
Ill. 617, 622, 50 N. E. 2d 758; Shepard v. State, Okl. Cr,
437 P. 2d 565, 600 (1967); Jackson V. State, 470 s. w.~
201 (Tex. 1971). In applying these holdings to the cw.
at bar, it is clear that no error was committed, sin~
clearly, the issue of consent was never raised by the d~
fendant. In fact, defendant denies that intercourse even
occurred. The reason for the existence of such a rule~
clear. While the prosecutrix's reputation for chastity E
material when the issue of consent is raised, the prejG
dicial effect that such evidence has absent the issue o:
consent far outweighs any purpose to be served by it
introduction. To confuse the issue before the jury wi~
the sensationalism which accompanies testimony of tlJi;
type would compound the difficulties inherent in crim
inal rape proceedings. Rule 45, Rules of Evidence, vest
with the trial judge the authority to exclude the type ol
testimony in question here if "he finds that the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk that I~
admission will (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice or of confusing the issues of misleading the
jury ... " (Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence). As pre~·
ously stated, this court will overturn the ruling of a trial
judge to admit evidence only if the judge has abused hil
discretion. See State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 49H
2d 670 (1972). For the same reason, the ruling of th<
trial judge to exclude testimony should carry the saJlll
presumption of correctness.
Appellant contends that the testimony of Jack Brad'
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was necessary to show that Sims had no reason to strike
or rape Miss Link in order to have sexual relations with
her. His testimony was to rebut the State's contention
that Sims assaulted and raped Miss Link because she
had refused to have intercourse with him. For this purpose (that of rebutting the State's presumption and helping to establish an alternative reasonable hypothesis)
Jack Brady's testimony was of little value. Even with
the addition of Mr. Brady's testimony, there was no other
reasonable hypothesis other than that Sims took Miss
Link to his shop, struck her over the head and raped her
because she refused to have intercourse with him. The
allegation that a robbery had occurred was not supported
by the facts and evidence introduced at trial. The allegation that Mrs. Link accused Sims of rape because she
was afraid her parents would find out about the sexual
relations she had had with her boyfriend is illogical, since
the evidence of sexual intercourse only came to light
after a pelvic exam was performed. That same pelvic
exam was performed only after the prosecutrix claimed
she had been raped. Had she not claimed rape, the pelvic
exam would not have been performed, and she would
only have been treated at the hospital for the injuries
she sustained as a result of the assault. Any function
to be served by Jack Brady's testimony was served by
the prosecutrix herself when she openly admitted in court
that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with her boyfriend, Cory. That coupled with the fact that she accepted
a date with Sims, a person she didn't know and had never
;:een, drank with him and parked with him, gave the jury
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a reasonable indication of the prosecutrix's reputation b
chastity and also her credibility. The testimony of Jad
Brady was not only prejudicial to the proceedings am1,
therefore, excluded but also is unnecessary to est.ablisn
either the reputation of the prosecutrix or her credibilicy,
For the aforementioned reason, the testimony of Jar.(
Brady was correctly excluded from the trial proceedingi.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore presented, respondenl
prays this court sustain the jury verdict of guilty.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
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